Home > Seminars > Michel Kinsy - Secure Multicore Architecture Design

Michel Kinsy - Secure Multicore Architecture Design

Start:

3/31/2016 at 3:30PM

End:

3/31/2016 at 5:00PM

Location:

356 Fitzpatrick

Host:

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Ronald Metoyer

Ronald Metoyer

VIEW FULL PROFILE Email: rmetoyer@nd.edu
Phone: 574-631-5893
Website: http://www.nd.edu/~rmetoyer/
Office: 325C Cushing

Affiliations

College of Engineering Assistant Dean of Diversity and Special Initiatives
Dr. Metoyer's research interests are broadly in the areas of human-computer interaction with an emphasis on information visualization and applications in the areas of health and wellness, education, intelligence analysis, and software engineering.
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The emergence of general-purpose system-on-chip (SoC) architectures has given rise to a number of significant security challenges. The current trend in SoC design is system-level integration of heterogeneous technologies consisting of a large number of processing elements such as programmable RISC cores, memory, DSPs, and accelerator function units/ASIC. These processing elements may come from different providers, and application executable code may have varying levels of trust. Some of the pressing architecture design questions are:  (1) how to implement multi-level user-define security; (2) how to optimally and securely share resources and data among processing elements; (3) how to use reconfiguration for the purpose of obfuscation to attackers.

In this talk, I will present two design cases of secure multicore architecture: (1) Securitas, an architectural framework for integrating multiple processing elements, which may include secure and non-secure cores, into the same chip design, while (i) maintaining individual tenant security, (ii) preventing data leakage and corruption, and (iii) promoting collaboration among the tenants. The Securitas architecture is based on a programmable secure router interface and trust-aware routing algorithm; (2) Sphinx, a hardware-software co-design architecture for binary code and runtime obfuscation. The Sphinx architecture uses binary code diversification and self-reconfigurable processing elements to enable the functionality of an application to remain the same while the binary code and architecture states are obfuscated and operate differently to attackers. This approach dramatically reduces an attacker’s ability to exploit information gained from one deployment to attack another deployment.

Seminar Speaker:

Michel Kinsy

University of Oregon

Michel A. Kinsy is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Computer and Information at the University of Oregon and director of the Computer Architecture and Embedded Systems (CAES) Laboratory. Prior to joining the University of Oregon, he was a Technical Staff at the MIT Lincoln Laboratory. He received his Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 2013. In his doctoral work he was one of the first to develop algorithms and hardware techniques to emulate and control large-scale power systems at the microsecond resolution. This work has been continued by the MIT spin-off, Typhoon HIL, Inc. His research interests lie in the general area of computer architecture, with particular emphasis on: (1) self-aware reconfigurable architectures, (2) secure architecture design, (3) fault-tolerant network-on-chip routing algorithms, and (4) embedded and cyber-physical systems. Michel is an MIT Presidential Fellow and holds an M.S. in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from MIT, a B.S.E. in Computer Systems Engineering and a B.S. in Computer Science from Arizona State University.